This paper presents novel empirical evidence on key predictions of heterogeneous …rm models by examining stock market reactions to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (CUSFTA). I derive testable predictions for a class of models based on Melitz (2003) . Using the uncertainty surrounding CUSFTA's rati…cation, I show that the pattern of abnormal returns of Canadian manufacturing …rms was strongly consistent with predictions related to export (U.S.) tari¤ reductions, but less so with predictions related to import (Canadian) tari¤ reductions. Lower Canadian tari¤s did have an e¤ect through the implied reduction in intermediate input tari¤s, however.
Many of the assumptions and predictions of heterogeneous …rm models are consistent with evidence from a large empirical literature which has emerged over the years. The strongest evidence is available for the productivity advantage of exporters, and for the self-selection of more productive …rms into export markets (e.g., Bernard et al. (2007) ). 1 Tybout (2001) summarizes several papers which show that trade liberalization episodes were accompanied by market share reallocations. A smaller literature also provides more direct evidence on the impact of lower trade costs on the reallocation of market shares between exporters and non-exporters (e.g., Tre ‡er (2004), Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) ). 2 A common feature of all empirical studies to date is their ex-post character. That is, they track the …rm-or sector-level variables of interest for a number of years and try to isolate the impact of trade policy changes from a large number of confounding factors. Depending on the speci…c setting of the liberalization episode, this can pose considerable econometric challenges (see, for example, Tybout, 2001 ).
In this paper, I take a di¤erent approach to providing evidence for the di¤erential impact of trade liberalization across …rms. I do so by using stock market reactions surrounding the implementation process of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (henceforth, CUSFTA). Under the assumption that unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation are su¢ ciently rapidly re ‡ected in stock prices, price reactions contain information about changes in future pro…ts and can be used to test heterogeneous …rm models.
The key advantage of such an event study approach over traditional ex-post evaluations is that the number of confounding factors is much more limited. Only factors about which expectations change during my one-to two-day event windows will have the potential to contaminate the estimates. Secondly, from a conceptual point of view, event studies present an interesting alternative to ex-post tests of heterogenous …rm models. These models essentially make predictions about changes in future per-period pro…ts brought about by trade liberalizations. To the extent that expectations about these changes will be re ‡ected in stock prices, analyzing price reactions will be conceptually closer to the models' theoretical predictions than looking at realized …rm-level variables ex-post. 3 CUSFTA is particularly well suited for providing evidence on heterogeneous …rm models in general, and for event study evidence, in particular. First, CUSFTA was a clearly de…ned policy experiment in the sense that it was neither introduced in response to a macroeconomic shock nor part of a larger package of reforms (Tre ‡er, 2004) . Second, the main instrument of liberalization -tari¤ cuts -is easily quanti…able and has a direct theoretical counterpart in heterogeous …rm 1 A few studies have also found productivity gains from exporting (e.g., De Loecker, 2007), or have noted that exporting and productivity-increasing investments are complementary activities (e.g., Bustos, 2011) . But even in this literature, the consensus is that new and existing exporters are more productive to begin with than …rms which remain non-exporters. 2 See Burstein and Cravino (2014) and Breinlich and Cuñat (2013) for the predictions of trade models with heterogeneous …rms with respect to measured productivity, i.e., productivity as measured in the data used by the empirical studies cited above. 3 Looking at stock price reactions also brings additional challenges as compared to traditional ex-post approaches. By construction, my sample consists of publicly traded …rms which are relatively large. The accounting data available for these …rm is also incomplete as far as export status is concerned. A …nal concern is that stock market event studies present a joint test of both the theory in question and the e¢ cient markets hypothesis (e.g., Campbell et al., 1997) . Below, I present detailed arguments as to why none of these issues is likely to a¤ect my results qualitatively, although they might make a quantitative interpretation more challenging. models. In addition, CUSFTA was a reciprocal agreement and is as such suitable for analyzing the di¤erential impact of domestic and foreign tari¤s. This distinction is a key element of many of the more recent heterogeneous …rm models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or Chaney (2008) . Third, as I will discuss in more detail below, the cross-sectoral variation in tari¤ cuts was both substantial and largely exogenous, allowing for the implementation of a di¤erence-indi¤erences estimation strategy within my event study framework. Finally, and more speci…cally relevant for an event study, CUSFTA was the main election issue in the Canadian federal election of November 1988. Both the election itself as well as a number of events in its run-up provide unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation which is essential for the successful implementation of an event study.
My analysis proceeds in two steps. I …rst show how stock price reactions can be used to test heterogeneous …rm models, and use a simple model of this class based on Chaney (2008) to derive testable predictions for the remaining sections. I then proceed to a test of these predictions, using unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation to analyze withinsector di¤erences in abnormal stock market returns. In practice, my estimation strategy will compare the stock returns of …rms which vary along a number of characteristics. I use …rm size (as measured by sales) in most speci…cations but also look at employment, productivity and export status. In addition to improving data availability, such a broad-based approach has several advantages. First, heterogeneous …rm models make predictions about stock market reactions of small vs large and less vs more productive …rms, in addition to reactions of new and existing exporters vs non-exporting …rms. As I explain below, using sales (or employment or productivity) in addition to export status also helps addressing the di¢ culty of identifying new exporters in the data and provides more direct evidence for the intra-industry reallocation predicted by models in the tradition of Melitz (2003) .
My …ndings are broadly supportive of the predictions of heterogeneous …rm models. The election victory of the ruling Progressive Conservatives (a strong supporter of CUSFTA) led to signi…cant stock market gains of large relative to small …rms (and of more productive relative to less productive, and exporting relative to non-exporting …rms). In contrast, opinion polls in the run-up to the election showing a substantial lead for the oppositional Liberal Party (who were opposed to CUSFTA) resulted in the opposite stock market return di¤erences.
In order to address the possibility that a Conservative election victory may have a¤ected di¤erent types of …rms di¤erently through channels other than CUSFTA, I compare between…rm return di¤erences across industries with di¤erent extents of tari¤ cuts. Consistent with theoretical predictions, I …nd that the relative gains and losses of larger (and more productive and exporting) …rms were indeed signi…cantly higher in sectors with larger U.S. tari¤ cuts. These results are robust to including a number of control variables such as changes in intermediate input tari¤s and …rms'multinational status.
As a further check on my results, I also examine stock market reactions to two earlier events which were directly related to CUSFTA but not the election itself: the reaching of an agreement on CUSFTA after di¢ cult negotiations between the U.S. and Canada in October 1987; and the refusal of the Canadian Senate to ratify the agreement in July 1988. I again …nd that stock prices of larger …rms increased relative to those of smaller …rms in reaction to the …rst event, and decreased in response to the second event. As before, reactions were stronger in sectors with higher future U.S. tari¤ cuts. Finally, I also perform placebo checks by looking at stock market reactions on dates on which no new information about CUSFTA was revealed. Consistent with theoretical predictions, I do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects in these additional regressions.
My results are less conclusive with respect to the e¤ects of reductions in Canadian import tari¤s. Most results suggests that larger Canadian …rms also gained relative to smaller …rms in response to such tari¤ cuts. However, the corresponding coe¢ cient estimates are generally small and have the wrong sign for some speci…cations and events. Interestingly, as I discuss below, these weaker results correspond to less clear-cut theoretical predictions of heterogeneous …rm models with respect to import tari¤ liberalization (as opposed to export tari¤ reductions), in the sense that the predictions of existing models seem to partially depend on speci…c modeling assumptions such as demand and cost structures. Some of my results suggest, however, that The use of cross-sectional variation in tari¤ cuts to implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach within the event study framework is also novel and substantially increases the potential for convincing econometric identi…cation. Finally, the present paper seems to be the …rst to attempt a quanti…cation of the di¤erential impact of trade liberalizations on the pro…ts of …rms within an industry, which is the driving force behind subsequent market share reallocations. 4 There are also a few studies which look at stock market movements during the Canadian election campaign from 1988 in di¤erent contexts. Together with the press coverage of the campaign and a number of political science studies, these inform my choice of events and are cited in more detail in Section 3 below.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how stock price reactions can be used to test heterogeneous …rm models, and uses a simple model of this class to derive testable predictions for the remaining sections. Section 3 describes CUSFTA and the speci…c events I study in more detail. Section 4 discusses the event study methodology and describes the data sources used. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Predictions
In this section, I …rst explain the link between stock market prices and …rm pro…ts. I then discuss the predictions of heterogeneous …rm models with respect to tari¤-cut-induced pro…t changes. In Section 2.2, I use a heterogeneous …rm model based on Chaney (2008) which is simple enough to demonstrate the mechanisms at work, yet su¢ ciently ‡exible to accomodate asymmetric countries and tari¤ barriers, two key features of CUSFTA. Section 2.3 discusses to what extent these insights carry over to more general settings. The online appendix to this paper provides analytical results for two popular extensions of Melitz (2003) , the original Chaney (2008) model and the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . 5 
Linking Stock Prices to Expected Pro…ts
The standard approach to linking stock prices and expected pro…ts is the dividend discount model (see Brealey and Myers, 2000) . The dividend discount model states that the price of …rm i 0 s shares at time t equals the net present value of its future stream of dividends per share:
where E(DIV i jI t ) is the expected value of future per-period dividends per share of …rm i, given information available on date t (I t ), and e i is the expected return on securities in the same risk class as …rm i. Assuming that …rms disburse all pro…ts as dividends, or that pro…ts are reinvested at an internal rate of return equal to e i , share prices are simply the net present value of expected future pro…ts per share: 6
Now consider the stock price reactions of any two …rms i and i 0 to an event which changes expectations about future pro…ts of these …rms. Denoting the event-induced stock market returns by r E i and r E i 0 , the return di¤erence between …rms i and i 0 is given by:
where I t+" is the new information set. What matters for the di¤erence in event-induced stock market returns is thus the change in expected future pro…ts of …rm i relative to …rm i 0 upon 5 The online appendix is available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~hbrein/. 6 It is straightforward to allow for growth in expected pro…ts and dividends, or for positive net present value projects (see Brealey and Myers, 2000) . Note that ei also controls for di¤erences in survival probabilities across …rms, so that the summation is always from s = 1 to in…nity. the arrival of new information (regarding the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation in the present case). 7 Since models of heterogeneous …rms make predictions about these pro…t changes, and how they vary across …rms with di¤erent sizes, productivity levels, or export status, stock market returns in response to unanticipated events can be used to implement empirical tests of this class of models.
Note that for testing the qualitative predictions of heterogeneous …rm models, the assumptions underlying my derivations can be substantially relaxed. For example, one could allow for more complex connections between dividends and pro…ts, as long as the positive correlation between changes in both variables is preserved. Likewise, it is not required that stock prices fully and immediately re ‡ect all relevant information. All that is needed is that new information about the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation is priced in to a statistically detectable extent within a period of one or two days (the standard length of my event windows). Given the importance of CUSFTA in the Canadian election campaign of 1988 and for the Canadian economy more generally, it seems reasonable that at least some market participants reacted quickly to the Conservatives'election victory and were able to judge CUSFTA's impact on …rm pro…ts, at least in terms of the direction of the change if not its exact magnitude. Note, in particular, that the extent of tari¤ cuts across sectors had been publicly known even before the successful conclusion of negotiations in October 1987 (see Section 3 for details).
Firm-Level Pro…ts and Trade Liberalization
I now turn to a formal discussion of how …rm pro…ts change after trade liberalization in a version of the model by Chaney (2008) . Consider a setting with N potentially asymmetric countries.
A representative consumer in each country derives utility from the consumption of goods from S + 1 sectors. The …rst S sectors each produce a continuum of di¤erentiated goods (Q sn ) and the remaining sector provides a single homogenous good (A n ):
where sn presents the set of available varieties of good Q ns , and s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties in sector s. Associated with Q ns is a price index Labor is mobile between sectors but immobile across countries. The numéraire sector operates under perfect competition and with a linear production function. As usual, pro…t maximization implies that wages in country n are equal to labor productivity ( An ), w n = An . 7 Note that I assume that discount rates (ei) stay constant in the derivation of (2) . As an approximation, (2) also holds if the ei change by the same factor for both …rms. Likewise, in the empirical analysis I will require that discount rates are either constant or that their changes are uncorrelated with the …rm characteristic (sales, export status etc.) along which I compare …rms' stock return reactions to CUSFTA-related events. I discuss issues related to discount rates in more detail in my robustness checks in Section 5.2. There, I also provide evidence that changes in discount rates in response to my events are unlikely to substantially bias my results.
The di¤erentiated goods are produced using labor as the only factor of production. Firms vary in productivity levels, , and have unit labor requirements of l ( ) = q= . In order to ship goods from country i to country j, …rms in sector s also have to pay an (ad-valorem) tari¤ of t s ij . In accordance with my empirical analysis, I focus on tari¤s here and abstract from additional trade costs. However, in the online appendix I show that all of the following results go through when I use standard iceberg-type trade costs. Finally, a …rm in country i selling goods to country j in sector s has to pay a …xed cost of f s ij in terms of the numéraire. Thus, …rm pro…ts from selling to market j are s ij (q; ) = 1 t s ij p s ij q w i q f s ij . Each …rm in the di¤erentiated goods sectors is a monopolist for the variety it produces and sets market-speci…c prices at p ij = (1 t ij ) . There are a large number (M ns ) of potential entrants in each country and sector which have to decide in which of the N countries to sell.
Productivity levels are known to …rms before entry. In equilibrium, only …rms which can earn non-negative pro…ts in a given market will serve that market, leading to market-speci…c productivity cuto¤s, ij;s . Finally, I assume that …rm productivity in country n, sector s, is Pareto distributed with density v ns ( ) = a s (k ns ) as (as+1) , where k ns > 0, a s > s 1 and k ns . For notational ease, I focus on a single sector and drop the subscript s from now on.
Under the above assumptions I obtain a solution for the entry cuto¤s ij in each sector as:
where A collects constant terms. If a …rm is active in market j, its pro…ts there can be expressed as a function of the relevant entry cuto¤. Total pro…ts of a …rm with productivity are:
I look at the impact of tari¤ reductions between Canada (i) and the United States (j) on Canadian …rms' pro…ts. I do so separately for Canadian and U.S. tari¤s, in analogy to the empirical analysis below which tries to disentangle the e¤ect of reductions in each of these two tari¤s. In the model, tari¤ cuts correspond to a lowering of t ij (U.S. import tari¤) and t ji (Canadian import tari¤). Because of quasi-linear preferences and the assumption of a …xed number of incumbents, third market pro…ts of Canadian …rms will not be a¤ected by changes in U.S. or Canadian import tari¤s (see expression (4)). Thus, it is su¢ cient to analyze changes in domestic pro…ts ( ii ) and in pro…ts from exports to the U.S. ( ij ). 8 I …rst look at the e¤ect of lower U.S. tari¤s. For …rms which export both before and after liberalization, I have:
In the following, I assume parameter values such that in > ii for all n. Thus, all active …rms serve the domestic market but only the more productive …rms export (which is the empirically relevant case).
where t ij denotes the initial tari¤ and t 0 ij the new (lower) tari¤. The relative pro…t change for existing exporters is positive because from (4), the domestic cuto¤ is not a¤ected and the U.S. export cuto¤ falls, 0 ij < ij . For …rms which export neither before nor after the tari¤ reduction, U.S. pro…ts ( ij ) are zero and the percentage change in pro…ts after a lowering of U.S. tari¤s is also zero because the domestic cuto¤ is not a¤ected:
Finally, for …rms which start exporting only after U.S. tari¤s have been reduced, we have:
Thus, existing and new exporters observe stronger relative pro…t increases than purely domestic …rms. From (2), we should thus observe a positive di¤erence in stock market returns between new and existing exporters and non-exporters upon the arrival of new information making an implementation of CUSFTA more likely. 9 Next, consider a reduction in Canadian tari¤s from t ji to t 0 ji . From (4), the export cuto¤ ij will not be a¤ected whereas the domestic entry cuto¤ ii will rise ( 0 ii > ii ). Thus, only domestic pro…ts will be a¤ected. The implied change in total pro…ts of exporting …rms will be:
For non-exporters which continue to serve the Canadian market we have:
So both exporters and non-exporters lose but losses in percentage terms are more severe for non-exporters. Intuitively, the part of exporters'total pro…t derived from the U.S. market is not a¤ected by Canadian tari¤ cuts, so that the relative decline in total pro…ts is smaller. Secondly, exporters are more productive and spread the market-speci…c …xed costs over a larger amount of sales. The percentage decline in domestic pro…ts alone will thus also be smaller.
Finally, the least productive Canadian …rms will exit the domestic market:
Thus, Canadian tari¤ reductions will reduce pro…ts of all Canadian …rms but exporters will be 9 Note that it is not possible to unambiguously rank the relative pro…t changes of existing exporters and new exporters. While the most productive new exporter will have a higher percentage pro…t change than all existing exporters, the least productive new entrant will have a relative change lower than that of all …rms already exporting. In contrast, absolute pro…t increases (i.e., rather than = ) are smallest for the least productive new exporter and increase monotonically with productivity, yielding an unambiguous ranking. In my robustness checks in Section 5.2, I show that with additional assumptions this result can be used to also make predictions about absolute changes in stock prices (as opposed to percentage changes). less a¤ected than both continuing and exiting domestic …rms. We should thus observe a positive di¤erence in stock market returns between exporters and non-exporters upon the arrival of new information making an implementation of CUSFTA more likely.
So far, the discussion of pro…t changes has been in terms of present or future export status.
But note that in the above model, the only …rm-speci…c characteristic which determines a …rm's export status is (labor) productivity. In addition, …rm sales are directly proportional to productivity. This implies that in the data, we should observe di¤erences in stock market returns across less and more productive, and smaller and larger …rms, in addition to return di¤erences between new and existing exporters, and non-exporting …rms.
Using sales or productivity as the …rm characteristic of interest also has the advantage that it provides more direct evidence on the reallocation mechanisms stipulated by models in the tradition of Melitz (2003) . To see this, note that a model in which export status is exogenously given, or at least unrelated to …rm size or productivity, would also predict that exporters should gain relative to non-exporters in reaction to U.S. tari¤ cuts. It would not, however, predict the ensuing productivity enhancing market share reallocation which is key to Melitz-type models.
It would also not predict that more productive or larger …rms gain relative to less productive or smaller …rms. As such, relying on …rm size or productivity allows for a more direct empirical test than relying on export status alone. 10 
Discussion
To what extent do these results carry over to alternative modeling frameworks? Chaney (2008) introduces income e¤ects in an otherwise identical model by letting his utility function take a pro…ts is low, the resulting equilibrium predictions of such a 'long-run'model for the pro…ts of existing …rms might be more relevant for stock price reactions then the predictions of 'short-run' models such as Chaney (2008) which abstract from free entry. 11 As I show in the online appendix, this does not matter for U.S. tari¤s reductions because the 'short-run'and 'long-run'predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) are qualitatively identical.
As in my baseline model, pro…ts of new and existing exporters are predicted to increase relative to non-exporters. In contrast, allowing for long-run entry makes a qualitative di¤erence to predictions with respect to domestic (Canadian) tari¤ reductions. Such reductions now lead to less entry, increasing the pro…ts of the remaining …rms. At the same time, better access to the Canadian market leads to increased entry of U.S. …rms which also serve their domestic market. This makes it more di¢ cult for Canadian exporters to sell there, lowering pro…ts from exporting. The assumption of linear demand in Melitz and Ottaviano implies that the smaller and less productive non-exporters will see a stronger percentage increase in their domestic pro…ts than exporters. They also do not su¤er a reduction of their export pro…ts. Thus, in the free-entry version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , Canadian tari¤ reductions favor those non-exporters in Canada which do not exit the market entirely (see the online appendix). 12 To summarize, my discussion suggests that the predictions of my simple Chaney-type model with respect to export (i.e., U.S.) tari¤ reductions carry over to a range of heterogeneous …rm models. In contrast, the relative e¤ect of import (i.e., Canadian) tari¤ reductions on …rms of di¤erent sizes and export status appears to be less robust, and might well be di¤erent in more general frameworks than the one presented here. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to place more emphasis on the results with respect to U.S. tari¤ cuts in the subsequent empirical analysis, although of course the estimated impact of Canadian tari¤ cuts might still be useful in discriminating between di¤erent versions of heterogeneous …rm models. 13 
Description of Events
The Canadian federal election on 21 November 1988 provides a sharply de…ned event which can be exploited for event study evidence. 14 CUSFTA was extremely contentious among the main 1 1 Formally and using the same notation as in (1)
where sr and lr denote per-period pro…ts in the short-and long-run. For …xed T with 1 T < 1, as ei ! 1 the short-run share of discounted pro…ts in total discounted pro…ts converges towards one. Likewise, as ei ! 0, the share of short-run pro…ts in total discounted pro…ts goes to zero.
Canadian political parties, with the governing Progressive Conservatives (who had negotiated the agreement) in favor, and broad sections of the main opposition parties (the Liberals and the New Democratic Party) opposed. Indeed, the Liberal Party's leader, John Turner, publicly vowed as late as October 1988 that he would dismantle CUSFTA in case of an election victory.
The fate of CUSFTA thus depended on the election outcome on November 21.
At the same time, CUSFTA received an unprecedented amount of attention in the election campaign and was the single-most important issue in voters'minds. In opinion polls taken in the month before the election, over 80% of the electorate cite CUSFTA as the most important election issue (Frizzell et al., 1989) . One would thus expect that market participants were aware of the key aspects of CUSFTA (including the extent of tari¤ cuts), and of the consequences a Conservative or Liberal election victory would have for CUSFTA's implementation.
Finally, the election outcome was highly uncertain. Given the particularities of the Canadian electoral system, the Conservatives needed a vote share of slightly more than 40% to obtain a parliamentary majority (Johnston et al., 1992) . As late as the week before the vote on November 21, however, opinion polls showed Liberals and Conservatives head-to-head at 35% of the vote each. 15 Such an outcome would have given Liberals and New Democrats a parliamentary majority and would have meant that CUSFTA would not be rati…ed. The turning point came only with the publication of three nationwide polls on November 19, the Saturday before the election. All three polls put the Conservatives at over 40% and clearly ahead of the Liberals.
These predictions proved to be almost exactly correct, and on November 21 the Conservatives won the election with 43% of the popular vote, compared to 32% for the Liberal Party and 20% for the New Democrats.
Besides the election itself, I will look at three earlier events which also changed the likelihood of CUFTA's implementation. The second event is the reaching of an agreement on CUSFTA between Canada and the U.S. on Saturday, 3 October 1987. 16 Negotiations had been di¢ cult and were only brought to a successful conclusion hours before the deadline on October 3 imposed by the U.S. Congress' fast-track procedure. Thus, the reaching of an agreement was to some extent unexpected. At the same time, the last-minute negotiations were concerned with details of CUSFTA's dispute-settlement procedure, while the remaining key elements of the agreement (including the extent and timing of the tari¤ reductions) had already been in place. So market participants were probably aware of most of its consequences at this point and the relevant news when markets opened on October 5 was simply that an agreement had been reached, and not about the exact nature of tari¤ cuts.
The third event is again related to CUSFTA's rati…cation. On the morning of 20 July 1988, John Turner, the Liberal Party's leader, announced at a press conference that he had instructed the Liberal majority in the Senate to block the rati…cation of CUSFTA until a general election, which was expected to be called within the next months. This was seen by many as a move to revive the electoral prospects of his party which was trailing in the opinion polls (Johnston et al., 1992) . By delaying the rati…cation, John Turner e¤ectively turned the general election into a referendum on CUSFTA. This move destroyed any hopes for a quick rati…cation and even raised the possibility that CUSFTA might not be implemented at all, given the hostility of Liberals and New Democrats to the agreement. events three and four imply a decrease in the likelihood of rati…cation and should lead to opposite stock market reactions from the election event. Events two and three present changes in the probability of CUSFTA's implementation which are unrelated to the election outcome.
They will provide additional evidence that market reactions were indeed due to CUSFTA rather than a Conservative election victory.
Methodology, Data and Descriptive Statistics
Methodology. Testing the theoretical predictions from Section 2 requires a model of "normal" stock returns which adjusts for di¤erences in risk and other characteristics of stocks. A standard approach in the literature is to use the so-called market model which relates the return on security i at time t to a stock-speci…c constant and the return on the market portfolio, R mt (Campbell et al., 1989; Binder, 1998) :
This approach controls for di¤erences in average returns across stocks ( i ), a stock's (nondiversi…able) risk as measured by i and movements in the market portfolio. The error term " it captures "abnormal" returns which in the present context could be caused by the arrival of unexpected news about the implementation of CUSFTA. 17 A straightforward way to measure abnormal returns related to CUSFTA is to directly model the error term in equation (6) according to the theoretical discussion from Section 2:
where the d et are a set of dummy variables, each taking a value of one for one particular day during event window E. The d j are industry …xed e¤ects, and d ix is a variable classifying …rms into groups in accordance with the predictions from Section 2. For example, in my baseline model in Section 2.2, it is related to the productivity level S separating non-exporters from …rms which start exporting in response to U.S. tari¤ cuts, and to the productivity level X separating exporter and non-exporters in the case of Canadian tari¤ cuts. The theoretical prediction is that …rms with productivity below these levels should lose relative to …rms with productivity levels above. As discussed, these levels are not directly observable in the data and I will use various proxies for d ix based on …rm sales, employment, productivity and export status (see below for details).
Equation (7) is estimated on a sample containing both pre-event and event data (see below for details). As discussed by Binder (1998) , and as I show in robustness checks reported in the online appendix, this one-step approach is equivalent to the traditional two-step procedure of …rst estimating the market model parameters i and i on pre-event data only (the so-called estimation period), computing abnormal returns as prediction errors of the market model during the event period, and then regressing these abnormal returns on industry …xed e¤ects and the proxy for d ix . A key advantage of (7) is that the modeling of heteroscedasticity and crosssectional dependence in abnormal returns is more straightforward and can be done via an appropriate clustering of standard errors in a standard OLS regression framework. 18 The coe¢ cient estimate^ 1e represents the average abnormal return di¤erence for …rms with di¤erent values for d ix on event day e, after controlling for industry …xed e¤ects. If an event takes place over more than one day (as is the case for my main election event), I calculate cumulative average abnormal return di¤erences (CAARs), de…ned as CAAR E = X E e=1^ 1e . As already discussed, one concern with (7) is that my main event (the general election) not only changed the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation but also expectations about other policies. For example, a conservative victory might have been seen as advantageous for …rms which are larger, more productive, or are present or likely future exporters. I thus make use of the sectoral variation in tari¤ cuts implemented under CUSFTA by estimating: 1 7 This is the part of stock returns I focused on in Section 2. Note that the dividend discount model can easily be extended to generate a "normal"rate of return in addition to event-induced (abnormal) returns by introducing expected dividend/pro…t growth. 1 8 Throughout this paper, I cluster standard errors by trading day (there are approximately 300 trading days in my estimation and event periods, depending on the particular speci…cation and event in question). This allows for both heteroscedasticity and arbitrary cross-sectional dependence in the residual it for a given day, andconsistent with the maintained assumption of market e¢ ciency -restricts intertemporal correlations to zero.
where dt CAN;j and dt U S;j denote Canadian and U.S. tari¤ cuts in industry j between 1988 and 1996, respectively. 19 Recall from the earlier discussion that larger, more productive …rms should bene…t more from higher U.S. tari¤ cuts than smaller, less productive …rms (i.e., 3e < 0, given that higher reductions imply a more negative dt). In the model from Section 2.2 this is also true for Canadian tari¤ cuts (i.e., 2e is also expected to be negative), although I noted that this prediction might not survive in other heterogeneous …rm models.
Introducing variation in tari¤ cuts into the modeling of abnormal returns means I only require the weaker identifying assumption that the di¤erential impact of a Conservative victory on …rms of di¤erent sizes, productivity levels and export status does not vary systematically with the extent of U.S. or Canadian tari¤ cuts. If Conservative policies simply bene…ted larger …rms more than smaller …rms, this e¤ect will be captured in the d ix dummies. Likewise, identi…cation is still assured if a Conservative election win bene…ted certain sectors more than others but not di¤erentially so across …rms of di¤erent sizes, productivity and export status -any such e¤ect will be captured by the industry …xed e¤ects in (8) . 20 Data. Estimation of (7) and (8) ) and other authors have also argued that tari¤ cuts under CUSFTA were exogenous. CUSFTA was a clearly de…ned policy experiment in the sense that it was neither introduced in response to a macroeconomic shock nor part of a larger package of reforms. It was also a free trade agreement under which tari¤s were reduced to zero. This meant that the extent of tari¤ cuts was exclusively determined by the initial level of tari¤s in each sector, so that there was no scope for policymakers to retain tari¤s for sectors in need of continued protection. Indeed, Tre ‡er (2004) experiments with di¤erent instrumental variable strategies and, using the same tari¤ data as in this paper, …nds no evidence for endogeneity problems in the corresponding Hausman tests. 2 1 I obtain CRSP portfolio returns from the Wharton Research Data Services (wrds.wharton.upenn.edu). The CRSP portfolio should be less susceptible to endogeneity concerns, given that the …rms in my sample represent a large share of the overall market capitalization in purely Canadian-based portfolios such as the S&P/TSX Composite Index. Also note that CRSP contains a number of Canadian …rms quoted on U.S. stock exchanges (but which only account for a small fraction of overall U.S. market capitalization). of 1980. I map these tari¤s into the industry classi…cation used by Datastream (the Industry Classi…cation Benchmark, ICB) which sorts manufacturing …rms into 20 broad industries. 22 Among the required …rm-level variables, data availability is best for …rm sales, followed by (labor) productivity and information on export status. As discussed, using …rm size (and productivity) also has the advantage of providing more direct evidence on the reallocation mechanism highlighted by models such as Melitz (2003) , and helps addressing the di¢ culty of identifying new exporters in the data. To illustrate this last point, recall from Section 2 that …rms which start exporting in response to U.S. tari¤ reductions belong conceptually to the same group of …rms as exporters -both observe pro…t increases relative to …rms which never export. In the present case, new exporters accounted for a large fraction of all exporters. For example, Baldwin and Gu (2003) report that the fraction of exporters among manufacturing …rms increased by almost 70% during the implementation period of CUSFTA. On the other hand, it is impossible to know whether all of these …rms started exporting because of CUSFTA or would have taken up exporting anyway. Thus, focusing on actual export status risks selecting an inappropriate mix of …rms for treatment and control groups.
In my baseline speci…cation, I thus proxy the key regressor d ix in (7) and (8) Table 1 provides summary statistics for the number of …rms, …rm sales and tari¤ reductions by industry. I note two main points. First, tari¤ cuts show substantial sectoral variation despite the relatively aggregate industry classi…cation used here (columns 6-7). Canadian tari¤ cuts range from sectors which basically enjoyed free trade 2 2 See Table 3 for a list of these industries. I use detailed descriptions of individual industries obtained from Datastream and Statistics Canada to construct a mapping from Tre ‡er's 213 Canadian Standard Industrial Classi…cation (CANSIC) industries to the 20 ICB industries used in this paper. This mapping was unique in 90% of cases, in the sense that each CANSIC industry could be mapped into one ICB industry only. I aggregate the tari¤ data to the ICB level by taking weighted averages across all CANSIC categories mapping into an ICB industry, using 1988 output shares of CANSIC industries as weights. Output data are also from Tre ‡er (2004). before CUSFTA to over 25% for "Beverages". U.S. tari¤ cuts are lower on average but still show strong sectoral di¤erences, with tari¤ cuts between 0% and close to 10%. Second, my focus on publicly traded …rms means that my sample is biased towards larger manufacturing …rms (see columns [3] [4] [5] . This size bias is of course an unavoidable feature of using stock market data for testing economic theories. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the size variation in my data will be informative about between-…rm di¤erences within industries. 23 First, there is a strong variation in sales within industries, ranging from small startups with sales of less than a million Canadian dollars to big corporations with several billion dollars in turnover. This somewhat alleviates the concern that my sample is unrepresentative of smaller …rms. Second, the export incidence among Canadian manufacturing …rms was much lower in 1988 than nowadays, implying a substantial number of non-exporters even among larger manufacturing …rms. 24 Third, and most importantly, the most probable e¤ect of any remaining sample bias will be to make it less likely to observe statistically signi…cant di¤erences in stock market returns between small and large …rms in response to news about CUSFTA. To see this, note that the sample bias towards larger …rms implies that even the smaller …rms in my sample are relatively large compared to the average Canadian manufacturing …rm. Thus, given the well-known positive correlation between …rm size and export status, it seems likely that the small(er) …rms included in my sample are closer to becoming exporters in the future and should bene…t more from trade liberalization than the small …rms excluded from my sample. As a consequence, my results will tend to underestimate the true di¤erential impact of tari¤ cuts on large vs small …rms. But given that below I do …nd statistically signi…cantly higher returns for larger …rms compared to smaller …rms within the same industry (at least in the case of U.S. tari¤ cuts), none of my qualitative conclusions in the following should be a¤ected by the speci…c sample composition that arises from focusing on publicly traded …rms. Figure 1 takes a closer look at the data by visualizing the di¤erence-in-di¤erences identi…-cation strategy embodied in my key speci…cation, equation (8) . I focus on my main event, the general election on November 21. However, to fully appreciate the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the election outcome, it is useful to look at a slightly longer window, starting a week before the televised debates between the main parties'leaders on October 24 and 25. For this period, I plot cumulative average return (CAR) di¤erences between large and small …rms, de…ned here simply as …rms with sales above and below the 50th percentile in each industry, respectively. 25 I plot CAR di¤erences for two groups of …rms. Those belonging to the 50% of 2 3 Within-industry size variation is the type of variation relevant for my comparison of stock returns of di¤erent types of …rms while controlling for industry …xed e¤ects. But note that in terms of overall economic activity, my sample is also quite representative of Canadian manufacturing, with …rms in my sample accounting for C$186 billion or approximately two thirds of total Canadian manufacturing sales in 1988. 2 4 Baldwin and Gu (2003 , Table 1 ) report that in 1984, the last year for which they have data before the implementation of CUSFTA in 1989, only 14% of manufacturing plants exported. This rises to 31% when looking at plants surveyed for the Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASM) which are substantially larger than the average Canadian manufacturing plant and thus correspond more closely to my sample of publicly traded …rms. As mentioned above, I only observe export status for around 20% of my …rms. But for the 54 …rm for which I observe export status, the fraction of non-exporters is still 30%. 2 5 The cumulative average return of a group of stocks G between t1 and t2 is de…ned as
ris, where ris is the return of stock i at time s and NG is the number of stocks in group G. The di¤erence in CARs between exporters and non-exporters in high tari¤ cut industries, for example, is then simply industries with the highest U.S. tari¤ cuts implemented under CUSFTA, and those with the 50% lowest tari¤ cuts. 26 CAR di¤erences are normalized to zero for both groups one week before the televised debates on October 24 and 25.
The …gure clearly shows a sharp divergence in the CAR di¤erences between high-and lowtari¤ cut industries in the aftermath of the debates, as the Liberal Party's standing in the polls improved. This divergence is particularly dramatic on the day of the publication of the Gallup poll, November 7. Also visible in the graph is the stabilization in CAR di¤erences between large and small …rms, and between high-and low-tari¤ cut industries, as the Conservatives caught up in the polls again. (The week beginning November 14 brought a couple of opinion polls showing the parties head-to-head.) Finally, the di¤erence between high-and low-tari¤ cut industries narrows sharply on election day, November 21, and to a lesser extent on November 22. Thus, this graphic analysis provides some …rst suggestive evidence that stock prices reacted to news about CUSFTA in a way consistent with the predictions of heterogeneous …rm models.
Results

Baseline Results
I now turn to the estimation of the baseline equations (7) and (8). Table 2 Table 2 reports results based on speci…cation (7), using log sales as my proxy for the key regressor d ix . The results indicate that larger …rms experienced signi…cantly higher abnormal returns -about 0.3 percentage points per log point of sales. This is consistent with the predictions of my baseline model from Section 2.2. As already mentioned, this result could also capture a more positive impact of a Conservative election victory on larger …rms.
In column 2, I include the tari¤ interaction terms as in (8) . As predicted, the sign on the U.S. tari¤ interaction is negative and signi…cant. Thus, larger …rms observed stronger positive abnormal returns in sectors with larger U.S. tari¤ cuts. This is strongly supportive of a Melitztype story in which larger …rms bene…t from increased export opportunities.
Larger …rms also bene…ted from higher Canadian tari¤ cuts relative to smaller …rms. This is consistent with my baseline model as well as with Chaney (2008) and the 'short-run'version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . While this e¤ect is highly statistically signi…cant, its absolute magnitude is much smaller than the e¤ect of U.S. tari¤ reductions, even after taking into account that Canadian tari¤ cuts were on average twice as large as U.S. tari¤ cuts (see Table 3 ).
CAR Xhigh CAR N Xhigh . Using abnormal rather than simple returns yields a similar picture. 2 6 I focus on U.S. tari¤ cuts since the theoretical predictions are unambiguous here. Graphs using Canadian tari¤ cuts yield a broadly similar picture.
Robustness Checks
I now examine the robustness of my baseline results presented in Table 2 . I focus on the most important robustness checks here, and report additional results in the online appendix. 27 Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity I: Sales-Based Measures. I …rst experiment with a number of alternative proxies for my key regressor d ix . Table 3 shows results for several indicators which are also based on …rm sales but which now take a binary form, classifying a …rm as bene…tting from trade liberalization if its sales exceed a given industry-speci…c threshold value.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 (2000) to introduce sectoral variation in the percentile threshold. 2 7 The online appendix presents results for: 1) changes in the length of the event period; 2) using a two-step estimation procedure where I calculate abnormal returns in a …rst step and use them as the dependent variable in a second step; 3) using Fama-French portfolios in the abnormal returns regressions to control for systematic return di¤erences across …rms related to size; 4) using returns rather than abnormal returns; 5) using log-returns as the dependent variable; 6) removing outliers and changing the sample composition in di¤erent ways; 7) using alternative tari¤ measures which only use the part of bilateral U.S. and Canadian tari¤ reductions which exceeds changes in the tari¤s between these countries and the rest of the world; and 8) realized ex-post changes in pro…t margins.
As discussed above, it is likely that exporting is more common among the …rms in my sample. Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity II: Actual Export Status. In Table 4 , I make use of the more limited information on export sales available in my data. In columns 1-4, I reestimate equations (7) and (8) for the 54 …rms for which I observe exports. 28 In columns 1-2, I set d ix = 1 for …rms which report positive export sales in 1988. In columns 3 to 4, I set d ix = 1 for …rms which report positive exports in either 1988 or during at least one year of CUSFTA's implementation period (1989-1997). As described above, these classi…cations yield exporter shares of 70% and 80%, respectively. The results for these speci…cations are again qualitatively similar to before, with exporters experiencing higher abnormal returns than non-exporters, with the di¤erence being stronger in sectors with larger U.S. tari¤ cuts.
The small size of these two subsamples precludes the use of industry …xed e¤ects. Together with the change in sample structure, this makes a direct comparison of coe¢ cient magnitudes with Table 3 di¢ cult. I thus reestimate equations (7) and (8) Table   2 and 3 (where larger …rms gained relative to smaller …rms). However, this result is obtained both when using the export status proxy for d ix and when using the binary proxies based on sales, again with almost identical coe¢ cient magnitudes. Thus, proxies for d ix based on sales and export information yield very similar results. Results using log sales for this smaller sample are harder to compare quantitatively to the results for export status because of the di¤erent functional form used. But as seen in columns 9 and 10, results are again qualitatively similar.
Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity III: Employment and Labor Productivity. I also experiment with proxies for d ix based on employment and labor productivity. For each of these variables, I construct proxies in the same way as for my preferred measures based on sales. That is, I …rst use the log of labor productivity or employment. I then classify a …rm as likely to bene…t from trade liberalization (d ix = 1) if its employment or labor productivity is higher than the 30th percentile of that …rm's industry. One downside of using these additional proxy variables is that information about …rm-level employment is only available for 210 …rms, implying a 15% reduction in sample size. 29 In any case, the results shown in Table   5 are qualitatively similar to my earlier results. The coe¢ cient estimates based on the two employment proxies are also quantitatively very close to the comparable proxies based on …rm sales. The estimates based on labor productivity are slightly higher with respect to U.S. tari¤ cuts and close to zero and insigni…cant for Canadian tari¤ cuts. 
Event-Induced Changes in Market Model
where d post is a dummy variable taking the value of one for dates on or after November 21, 1988 . Columns 1-2 of Table 6 presents the corresponding results. In column 1, I only allow the i to change with the event whereas in column 2, the i are allowed to change as well. Results in column 1 are basically identical to my baseline estimation, while allowing i to vary only results in minor changes in parameter estimates.
A related concern is that the election event could have changed a stock's expected return (e i in the notation of Section 2, equation 1) and thus the appropriate discount rate for future pro…ts, in addition to future pro…ts themselves (E( i jI t )). Indeed, there is a large literature on the relative importance of cash ‡ow and discount rate news in explaining stock returns (see Cochrane (2011) and Koijen and van Nieuwerburgh (2011) for recent surveys). While the more recent literature …nds a larger role for cash ‡ows, it still attributes up to 50% of stock price variation to unexpected changes in discount rates (e.g., Chen, Da and Zhao (2013)). Discount rate changes around my event dates are of course not directly observable, making it di¢ cult to evaluate their role in explaining my results. However, two observations make it likely that they were not of …rst order importance.
First, any changes in discount rates would have to be correlated with my …rm performance measures and tari¤ cuts. That is, discount rate changes would need to impact the return di¤erences between large and small …rms, and the impact would need to be stronger in sectors with larger tari¤ cuts. This is a much stronger requirement than a simple change in discount rates in response to my events.
Second, my previous results on changes in stocks'market model parameters provide some tentative evidence that changes in discount rates were not quantitatively important in my setting. To see this, note that the market model provides a natural benchmark for what the expected rate of return of a stock should be: e it = E (r it ) = i + i E (R mt ). 31 In a …rst step, I use my estimates for changes in i and i from the previous regresssions to identify stocks with statistically signi…cant changes in e it . 32 This is the case for only about 15% of stocks in my sample, indicating that signi…cant changes in discount rates are not common.
These changes are also essentially uncorrelated with my measures of …rm heterogeneity or tari¤ reductions. 33 Secondly, I drop all stocks with signi…cant estimated changes in e it from my sample, and re-estimate my baseline equation (column 3). Finally, in column 4, I directly control for the estimated change in e it in my market model regression rather than dropping stocks. 34 Again, the results in these last two columns are very similar to my baseline estimates, indicating that changes in expected returns are not the main drivers of my earlier results.
Intermediate Input Tari¤s and Multinational Status. In Table 7 , I consider two potential alternative explanations for my results. 3 1 An explicit and full integration of the trade models and the dividend discount model from Section 2 with an equilibrium model of asset prices is beyond the scope of this paper. But note that my expression for ei follows naturally from just such an equilibrium model (the Capital Asset Pricing Model or CAPM). The CAPM states that eit = r f + i (E(Rmt) r f ), where r f is the risk-free rate of return, i measures an asset's sensitivity to non-diversi…able (or market) risk, and Rmt is the return on the market portfolio. Thus, the market model nests the CAPM equation as a special case with i = (1 i ) r f . 3 2 These are stocks for which the following equality is rejected at the 5% level: i + ip + i + ip Rmp = i + i R mb , where R mb and Rmp are the average pre-and post-election returns on the market portfolio. 3 3 The correlation coe¢ cient between log-sales and the di¤erence in expected returns (eit;post eit;pre) is 0.061. The correlation coe¢ cient between log-sales and the percentage change in expected returns (eit;post=eit;pre) is 0.066. 3 4 In the notation of equation (2), di¤erences in event-induced (or abnormal) returns across …rms in the presence of changes in ei are rE;i r E;i 0 =
e it e it+" E( i 0 jI t+" ) E( i 0 jI t ) e i 0 t e i 0 t+"
. Disregarding second-order terms, this is approximately equal to
e it e it+" e i 0 t e i 0 t+" . This motivates my inclusion of
as an additional regressor in the abnormal return part of (8).
intermediates. 35 To control for this possibility, I rerun my baseline speci…cation but include an additional interaction term between reductions in Canadian intermediate input tari¤s and log sales. I construct input tari¤s by using the Canadian input-output matrix together with the information on Canadian tari¤ reductions used previously. As is standard in the literature (see Amiti and Konings (2007) Column 1 in Table 10 shows results controlling for intermediate input tari¤s, column 2 for MNE status, and column 3 includes both control variables jointly. As expected, stronger reductions in input tari¤s further increase the abnormal return di¤erence between large and small …rms. In contrast, MNE status lowers abnormal returns in sectors with higher tari¤ reductions, although the e¤ect is only statistically and economically signi…cant for U.S. tari¤ cuts. This is consistent with, for example, a tari¤-jumping motive for foreign direct investment, in which Canadian MNEs establish U.S. production sites to avoid export duties on their sales there. As U.S. tari¤s are eliminated, the value of this local presence is diminished. Placebo Checks. I now turn to settings for which I would not expect to …nd signi…cant abnormal return di¤erences between large and small …rms, nor a strong variation of these di¤erences across industries with high and low tari¤ cuts. Speci…cally, I estimate speci…cation 3 5 This is particularly true given the positive correlation between the (output) tari¤s used in my regressions and intermediate input tari¤s. In my sample, the correlation of Canadian intermediate input tari¤s with Canadian output tari¤s is 28%, and the correlation with U.S. output tari¤s is 47%. See below for how intermediate input tari¤s were constructed. 3 6 A …rm is classi…ed as an MNE if it either reports positive local a¢ liate sales abroad or owns assets outside of Canada. Using alternative de…nitions based on either of these two variables yields almost identical results. 3 7 Quantitatively, this impact is similar to that of U.S. tari¤ reductions. For the average …rm (log (sales) = 6:64, input = 4:7%), reducing intermediate input tari¤s to zero leads to a predicted abnormal return increase of 3.7 percentage points, compared to an increase of 4.9 percentage points for the elimination of U.S. tari¤s. (8) for dates between 1 November 1987 and 30 June 1988, a period during which the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation did not vary substantially. I repeatedly draw two consecutive trading dates from this period at random and estimate (8) for these dates. I then calculate cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) based on my estimates of^ 1e ,^ 2e and^ 3e for these random two-day event windows. I repeat this procedure 1,000 times, thus obtaining a set of 1,000 CAARs estimates comparable to the ones presented in Table 2 . I report means, standard deviations and percentiles of the resulting distributions in Table 8 .
In the light of the earlier theoretical discussion, one would not expect …rm size to matter much as a determinant of abnormal returns in this earlier period, both on its own and when interacted with tari¤ cuts. On the other hand, if my results so far were picking up some general characteristics of …rms or sectors correlated with …rm size and tari¤ cuts, one would expect parameter estimates of the same magnitude as in my baseline results to show up more frequently than expected from pure sampling variation. For example, if large …rms in sectors with high future U.S. tari¤ cuts systematically experienced above average abnormal returns, my baseline and additional results might be due to some (unknown) omitted factor. Table 8 shows that this is not the case for the U.S. tari¤ cut interaction. The probability of observing two-day U.S.-tari¤-related CAARs on randomly chosen dates which are as large or larger than the magnitudes reported in Table 4 is only about 3%. In contrast, the probability of generating two-day Canadian tari¤-related CAARs larger than in Table 2 is higher at around 30%. In both cases, however, I am unable to reject the hypothesis that that the mean of my generated
CAARs is equal to zero (see column 3).
Absolute Price Changes. The model from Section 2 also provides an interesting additional testable prediction related to absolute price changes which I brie ‡y discuss here. Recall that in response to Canadian tari¤ reductions, domestic Canadian …rms were predicted to see a relatively larger fall in pro…ts than exporters relative to initial pro…ts. However, the absolute decline in pro…ts (i.e., rather than = ) is smallest for the least productive …rms and largest for the most productive ones. So absolute price changes ( p rather than p=p) should be more negative for the more productive exporters than for purely domestic …rms. 38 In contrast, the ranking of absolute pro…t changes of Canadian …rms remains unchanged when looking at U.S.
tari¤ reductions. Existing and new exporters see stronger increases than non-exporters, thus implying that the former should see stronger absolute price increases than the latter. 39 I test this additional prediction by using absolute price changes (p t p t 1 ) rather than returns as the dependent variable. Using absolute price changes has of course the signi…cant disadvantage that the methodological framework of event studies no longer applies. As a con- 3 8 From (1), pit pit 1 = e
, and 0 ii > ii , prices should decline by more for more productive and thus larger …rms. Note, however, that discount rates ei do not cancel out when looking at absolute price changes, even if they are not changed by the event itself. So to see stronger absolute price declines for larger …rms, I need the additional assumption that di¤erences in ei are either unrelated to size or at least not su¢ ciently higher for larger …rms.sequence, it is now unclear which part of price changes are to be classi…ed as 'normal' and 'abnormal'. The inclusion of stock-speci…c correlations with the market portfolio also no longer has a theoretical basis. Thus, I estimate an adhoc variant of (8) of the form:
In Table 9 , I show results for my log-sales proxy as well as for the preferred binary sales proxy from Section 5.2, which uses the 30th percentile of industry sales as the relevant cuto¤.
Interestingly, the Canadian tari¤ interaction does change sign although it is only signi…cant for the binary sales proxy. Also consistent with the model's predictions, the coe¢ cient on the U.S. tari¤ interaction remains positive and highly signi…cant. Thus, although the theoretical foundations of these additional results are less robust than that of my baseline speci…cation, they provide additional support for the predictions of the class of heterogeneous …rm models analyzed here.
Additional Events. I also present results for the three additional events discussed in Section 3. In Table 10, Interestingly, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates for all three additional events is smaller than that of the estimates relating to my baseline event, the Conservative election victory on November 21-22 (see Table 2 ). This is consistent with the idea that the latter event represented the most signi…cant change in CUSFTA's implementation probability, given that its rati…cation by the Canadian parliament was far from assured just before the election but almost certain right after the Conservative victory.
Quanti…cation of Results
I now analyze the quantitative importance and plausibility of the estimated abnormal return di¤erences more closely. I present two sets of …gures. First, predicted abnormal returns are easily computed using a simple transformation of my baseline equation (8):
where c ar iE denotes the predicted value of the (cumulative) abnormal returns of stock i during event window E (here, the election victory of the Conservatives on November 21 and 22).
Secondly, I also compute implied pro…t changes. I do so by using the link between returns and pro…ts implicit in equation (1), and solving for pro…t changes as a function of predicted abnormal returns and ex-ante and ex-post implementation probabilities:
where c ar iE are the predicted abnormal returns during the election event, iC are per-period pro…ts after a successful implementation of CUSFTA, and iN C per-period pro…ts without CUSFTA. I t denotes information available at time t, and prob Ct and prob Ct+" the probability of a successful implementation of CUSFTA before and after the Conservative election victory, respectively. Note that I use E ( i jI t ) = prob Ct iC + (1 prob Ct ) iN C in the above derivation.
That is, the expected future pro…tability of …rm i is a weighted mean of pro…ts with and without CUSFTA, where the weights represent the probability of CUSFTA's implementation.
It is this probability which changes with the election (i.e., between time t and t + "). Note that I require assumptions about the probability of CUSFTA's implementation prior to and after the Conservative election victory, and not just about the change in the probability.
Intuitively, the size of the predicted abnormal returns is a function of the net present value of pro…ts under the free-trade regime and the alternative scenario without tari¤ cuts, as well as the change in the likelihood of CUSFTA's implementation brought about by the Conservative election victory (controlling for the ex-ante probability, prob Ct ). If discount rates are not changed by the election result, the change in the net present value of pro…ts in turn is equal to the change in per-period pro…ts. Note, however, that linking returns and pro…ts in this way requires (1) to hold exactly, rather than as an approximation as was required previously (compare the discussion in Section 2.1). Any biases arising from the fact that I am using a sample of publicly traded (and thus larger) …rms will of course also be more relevant here then for the qualitative …ndings presented so far. Thus, the results in this section are best seen as back-ofthe-envelope calculations suitable for judging the quantitative importance and plausibility of my estimates, rather than as providing information about the structural parameters or results in standard quantitative trade models.
With these caveats in mind, I turn to an interpretation of my quantitative results. The …rst line of Table 11 reports the averages of predicted abnormal returns for large and small …rms, respectively, for the election event window. I …rst use my preferred binary sales-based proxy for d ix (see Table 3 , column 2) to compute abnormal returns, since the 0-1 classi…cation of …rms into large and small used there makes the presentation of results straightforward. According to these estimates, large …rms experienced predicted abnormal returns of 0.9% on average, and small …rms of -0.1%, yielding a di¤erence of one percentage point (see column 1).
As noted before, these predicted abnormal returns are also likely to be in ‡uenced by the general impact of a Conservative election victory on stock markets, and possibly by a di¤erential impact across smaller and larger …rms (e.g., if the Conservatives were perceived to be "pro big business"). To strip out these two types of confounding impacts, columns 2 and 3 present average predicted abnormal returns based on (10) but disregard industry …xed e¤ects (column 2) or industry …xed e¤ects and the non-interacted export dummy (d ix , column 3) in the return computation. Focusing on these parts of predicted abnormal returns, which are more closely linked to the predictions of heterogenous …rm models, yields a larger return di¤erence between large and small …rms of 1.1 percentage points (column 2) and 2.7 percentage points (column 3).
Columns 4-6 compute the same statistics but use estimates based on my baseline proxy of d ix , the log of …rm sales (see Table 2 for the speci…cation excluding both industry …xed e¤ects and the level term in log sales.
In lines 2-5 of Table 11 , I present results for implied pro…t changes, using di¤erent sets of assumptions about ex-ante and ex-post implementation probabilities. Given the strong support for CUSFTA voiced by the Conservatives and the fact that their representatives had negotiated the agreement in the …rst place, it seems appropriate to set the ex-post implementation probability to 100% in all scenarios. The implied pro…t change is thus determined by assumptions about the ex-ante likelihood of implementation. In line 2, I use a value of 0% which is the most conservative assumption in the sense of yielding the smallest implied pro…t changes. The corresponding results thus provides a useful lower bound for the true pro…t impact of CUSFTA.
Lines 3-5 make more realistic assumptions about the ex-ante probabilities. As discussed, the likelihood of a Conservative election victory was estimated by most observers to be not more than 50% prior to the publication of the opinion polls on November 19. Thus, in lines 3-5 I choose ex-ante probabilites centered around 50% (30%, 50% and 70%, respectively).
As can be easily veri…ed from (11), implied pro…t changes are equal to abnormal returns in the most conservative scenario of a 0%-100% change in the implementation probability of CUSFTA, and increase for higher ex-ante probabilities. Depending on the speci…c way of calculating predicted abnormal returns and the assumptions about ex-ante probabilities, the average implied di¤erence in pro…t changes between large and small …rms lies between 1 and (8) and (10) for the underlying specification and Tables 2 and 3, 
